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the protestors' imprisonment contravened prov1s1ons of the European
Convention on Human Rights. 232 The Commission issued its decision in
May of 1980. Although it gently chastised the British Government for its
intransigence,233 the Commission denied the legitimacy of the prisoners'
claims. The decision is important in that its deconstruction indicates four
things: first, that legal authorities, in making decisions, not only
delegitimize some practices, they legitimize others; secondly, that the
Commissioners operated upon a liberal humanist conception of the
"subject", and that this resulted in a "blame the victim" approach; thirdly,
that the Commissioners subjected the plaintiff prisoners to what Lyotard has
called the injustice of the "double bind"; and fourthly, that the Com
missioners exercised a gratuitous "will to power" that served to silence the
"other."
First, I will consider the argument that juridical decision-making is a
form of legitimation and delegitimation. Conventionally, when com
mentators approach decisions of human rights organizations, the framework
of analysis tends to be that such bodies serve an essentially regulative role,
that is, that their function is to operate as a check upon the abuse of power
by states against their citizens. In other words, the assumed paradigm is that
the function of human rights organizations is the delegitimation of states
that infringe human rights. However, as Hegel notes:
Whal is "familiarly known" is nol properly known, just for the reason that it
is "familiar." When engaged in the process of knowing, it is the commonest
form of self-deception, and a deception of other people as well, to assume
something to be familiar, and to let it pass on that very account. 234

Drawing on this insight, I will argue that the conventional assumption
reveals only half the story, because the effect - if not the intention - of
a determination by a human rights organization such as the Commission
against a plaintiff is to legitimize repressive state practices.
To be more specific, when, for example, the European Commission was
discussing the standard of "inhuman and degrading treatment" within the
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, it emphasized that to be
sanctionable, the "ill-treatment must attain a minimal level of severity ... a
particular level" which was "relative" depending upon "all the circum
stances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or
mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the
victim."235 It seems to me that such propositions not only signal an
embracement of flexibility that allows for a great deal of leeway in statist

232 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature, Nov. 4th 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted 1950 Y.B.H.R. 418.
Application No. 8317/78.
233 McFeely, supra note 151 at 86.
234 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie (New York: Harper and
Row, 1967) at 127.
235 McFeely, supra note 151 at 79, 88, 89.
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abuse, it also positively legitimizes any abuse up to that elusive level. 236 It
sanctifies an acceptable level of state violence and, in so doing, has the
effect of encouraging continued state domination and abuse.237
Moreover, in this case not only did the Commission legitimize certain
practices of domination, it helped to undermine the integrity of at least one
plaintiff by gratuitously referring to his past: "In 1974 the applicant ...
blasted his way out of Portlaiose prison, near Dublin."238 What, precisely,
is the relevance of a plaintiff's prior history of escape in a different country
(Ireland) when the complaint is one of abuse by the British state? The only
function that such an unnecessary reference can serve is to reinforce the
juridical construction of the "terrorist" - the modem day folk devil - and
therefore to justify his or her criminalization and incarceration.
Secondly, the Commission rested its decision on a liberal humanist
conception of the subject and therefore issued a "blame-the-victim" type
decision. Much of the plaintiffs' argument was based upon Article 3 of the
Convention, claiming that the physical conditions of their imprisonment
constituted "inhuman and degrading treatment." The trump card played by
the Commission in dismissing the claim was the rather obvious assertion
that the conditions of which they complained were freely chosen by the
prisoners,239 that they were "self-imposed deprivations",240 "self-inflicted
debasement and humiliation",241 in short "their own responsibility."242 From
the perspective of the Commission, the prisoners were masters of their own
destiny.
This is an important argument, also often applied to the hunger strike:
that it was suicide. However, to analyse the Commission's ascription of
responsibility, it is necessary to temporarily depart from the juridical level
to address the issue at the ontological level.
As I will argue in Part IV, B, there are at least three competing
conceptions of the self: the sovereign (or liberal) self; the situated (or
relational) self; and the saturated ( or postmodern) self. The postmodern or
saturated conception of the self will not be addressed at this point. A liberal
humanist ontology, premised as it is upon the idea of a sovereign and
solitary individual, argues that "man [sic] is the master and possessor of the
totality of his actions and ideas."243 A situated or relationalist ontology
argues that the subject is a dynamic and self-reflexive potential influenced,
though not determined, by a matrix of societal and cultural forces.244
236 For example, the Commission acknowledges that a "restrictive diet..though harsh does
not amount to a sufficiently rigorous punishment...amount(ing) to inhuman or degrading
punishment", id. at 89. The analysis adopted by the Commission is highly reminiscent
of Diplock's legitimation of abuse during interrogation. Diplock Report, supra note 145.
237 It should also be noted that the Commission uncritically endorses the recommendations
of the Gardiner Committee, supra note 147, on several occasions, id. at 81, 100.
238 Supra note 151 at 47.
239 Id. at 84.
240 Id. at 80.
241 Id. at 81.
242 Id. at 83.
243 L. Ferry & A. Renaut, French Philosophy of the Sixties: An Essay on Antihumanism,
trans. M. Cattani (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990) at xvi.
244 See infra Part IV, B.
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These competing conceptions of the self engender alternative conceptions
of the self's "responsibility" for its actions. Within the liberal humanist
approach, given that the self is an autonomous and self-possessed
individual, the question of responsibility is relatively straightforward: the
sovereign self is responsible for his or her actions, subject, perhaps, to
certain very limited exceptions such as insanity or infancy. 245 Clearly, this
dovetails with the Commission's response to the prisoners' claims: it was
their choice; responsibility was grounded in and emanated from the total
self.
The situated or relational approach considers the question of
responsibility to be much more complex because it demands a contextual
inquiry into both the self and the circumstances that give rise to his or her
actions. Thus, responsibility does not inhere, or automatically originate, in
the a priori subject. Rather, responsibility is a cultural, social, moral and
juridical attribution following upon the weighing of all the relevant
circumstances. Consequently, in relation to the prisoners' claim that the
conditions of their imprisonment were "inhuman and degrading", I would
argue that it is crucial to consider their subjectivities, their "legal
sensibilities" as well as the "legal sensibility" of the state. In this light, I
would then propose that responsibility lay with both sides, that it was
"shared." Such an approach recognizes the agentic capacities and
responsibilities of the self, but at the same time avoids a legal formalism
and vulgar ontology that blinds us to people's existential realities. More
over, a relational approach to responsibility may help to avoid zero-sum
thinking246 which encourages the kind of polarization that can lead to such
tragedies as the hunger strike. And it certainly enables us to avoid blaming
the victim.247
Thirdly, the foregoing discussion of the prisoners' "choice" leads to a
consideration of the Commissioner's decision as a manifestation of the
Lyotardian "double-bind." As discussed earlier, Lyotard rejects ideas of
consensus or the feasibility of a grundnorm. He considers justice to be the
proliferation of mini-narratives and multiplicity, the embracement of
disputation and dissensus, the acceptance of paralogy.248 Injustice, in
245 It might be noted that such an approach makes juridical decision-making relatively
uncomplicated: there is a primafacie and a priori assumption of individual responsibility
unless extenuating circumstances indicate otherwise.
246 The Commissioners determined that, "they [the prisoners] alone must bear responsibility
for the choice they have made." McFeely, supra note 151 at 84 [emphasis added]. Two
further points may be worth noting. Sinn Fein, translated into English, means "ourselves
alone", and why not, one might ask, given such juridical antipathy? Secondly, such a
unilateral ascription of responsibility -inevitably encouraged the British government as
to the righteousness of its intransigence. As a consequence, I would argue, in accordance
with my relational thesis of responsibility, that the Commissioners' decision makes them,
in part, responsible for the subsequent fast and deaths. This is also why I talk about "the
Commissioners" rather than some abstract "Commission".
247 At a minimum, such a proposal would prevent the Commissioners from solipsistically
endorsing the recommendations of the Gardiner Committee, supra note 147 at 81, 100,
and instead, inquire to what extent such a Report constitutes part of the problem, rather
than part of the solution.
248 See supra note 68.
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Lyotard's account, is the assumption that the claims of "the other" can be
translated into the "language game" or "genre" of the dominant narrative,
thereby excluding as irrational, unfounded or unbelievable that which is not
translatable. In such a situation, the plaintiff is deprived of a narrative, the
right to tell her or his story:
This is what a wrong [tort] would be: a damage [dommage] accompanied by
the loss of the means to prove the damage. This is the case if the victim is
deprived of life, or of all his or her liberties, or of the freedom to make his
or her ideas or opinions public, or simply of the right to testify of the
damage, or even more simply if the testifying phrase itself is deprived of
authority. ... In all of these cases then, to the privation constituted by the
damage there is added the impossibility of bringing it to the knowledge of
others, and in particular to the knowledge of a tribunal. Should the victim
seek to bypass this impossibility and testify anyway to the wrong done to him
or her, he or she comes up against the following argumentation: either the
damages you complain about never took place, and your testimony is false;
or else they took place, and since you are able to testify to them, it is not a
wrong that has been done to you, but merely a damage, and your testimony
is still false. 249

Thus, we encounter one aspect of "the dilemma of difference", 250 the double
bind in which "the defining feature of a wrong is that it cannot be proven"251
because it is unintelligible within the dominant adjudicative model. Lyotard
explains:
Either you are a victim of a wrong, or you are not. If you are not, you are
deceived (or lying) in testifying that you are. If you are, since you can bear
witness to this wrong, it is not a wrong, and you are deceived (or lying) in
testifying that you are the victim of a wrong. Let p be: you are the victim of
a wrong; not-p: you are not; Tp: phrase p is true; Fp: it is false. The argument
is: either p or not-p; if not-p, then Fp; if p, then not-p, then Fp. The ancients
called this argument a dilemma. It contains the mechanism of the double bind
as studied by the Palo Alto school, it is a linchpin of Hegelian dialectical
logic.... This mechanism consists in applying two contradictory propositions,
p and not p, two logical operators: exclusion (either... , or) and implication
(if. .. then). So, at once [(either p or not-p) and (if p, then not-p)]. It's as if you
f
said both, either it is white, or it is not white; and i it is white, it is not
white. 252

Applying these propositions to the McFeely decision, the double bind
within which the Commission entrapped the prisoners was that if the latter
249 Differend, supra note 70 at 5.
250 Supra note 227 at 20.
251 G. Bennington, Lyotard: Writing the Event (New York: Columbia University Press,
1988) at 143.
252 Differend, supra note 70 at 5-6.
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wanted to remain consistent with their political ideology by claiming to be
political prisoners or prisoners of war, then they could not come within the
parameters of the European Convention. Thus, in order to secure the
protective mantle of the Convention, they would have to abandon their
political convictions and acknowledge that they were "ordinary decent
prisoners." However, in that case, they would have nothing to complain
about because they would then simply be unruly and disruptive prisoners
whose punishments were "necessary in a democratic society for the
prevention of disorder or crime",253 and justifiable "in the interests of public
safety."254 Like troscead/cealathan the prisoners' claims were simply
"untranslatable" into the dominant juridical discourse. In short, "[i]tis in the
nature of a victim not to be able to prove that one has been done a
wrong."255 The Commissioners failed to heed the appeal to alterity, they
refused to listen.
Fourth, and finally, the Commissioners' decision manifests a juridico
bureaucratic "will to power." In many ways, the core of the prisoners'
demand was contained in their invocation of Article 9 of the Convention
which provides, in part, that "everyone has the right to freedom of
conscience and religion."256 But, by inverse logic, this is the argument to
which the Commission gives the shortest shrift. The prisoners argued that
their conscience and belief in their prisoner of war status should be
recognized as protected under this provision through a recognition of
"special category status." The Commissioners' response is dazzling in its
certitude:
The Commission is of the opinion that the right to such a preferential status
for a certain category of prisoner is not amongst the rights guaranteed by the
Convention or by Article 9.257

Reasons given: none. Justification: none. The prisoners' convictions, their
conscience, their beliefs - convictions for which their colleagues would,
within months, fast to the death for - were summarily dismissed.
However, several pages later, perhaps somewhat discomfited by their
overhasty disregard of the prisoners' sense of their self identity, the
Commissioners return to the question of political prisoner status; but with
a vengeance. Although the issue was raised neither by the plaintiff prisoners
nor the defendant British government, the Commissioners went out of their
way to pontificate, again without further elaboration, that "the Commission
does not consider that such an entitlement [political prisoner status] in the
present context can be derived from the existing norms of International
Law."258 I interpret this as the invocation of a masternarrative International Law, with a capital I and a capital L - to assert a will to
253
254
255
256
257
258

Mcfeely, supra note 151 at 90.
Id. at 91.
Differend, supra note 70 at 8.
Supra note 232.
Mcfeely, supra note 151 at 77.
Id. at 80.

50

Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice

1994

power on the part of international bureaucrats. 259 By invoking the
foundationalist, reified and legitimizing discursive regime of International
Law, the Commissioners could feign positivist formalism. By claiming that
their hands were tied, they could justify a gratuitous mandarin antipathy to
the marginalized, and categorically silence the claims of the colonized who
have the upstart audacity to challenge their colonizers. 260
Le Differend has its critical-political goal the uncovering of differends where
they have been repressed or supposedly resolved; it argues for the necessity
of listening to the idiom not given its day in court, to the silence imposed on
the victims of oppression and injustice. It attacks .all mec hanisms of
repression, all courts, institutions, systems of thought that perpetuate the
injustice of universal judgment and thus do not recognize the silence imposed
on their victims. 261

Within six months of this silencing, the prisoners resorted to their own,
local, indigenous and embodied legal claim: the fast.
V. THE POLITICAL AMBIVALENCES OF POSTMODERNISM262
In Part III, I drew on the critical analytical insights of postmodernism and
deconstruction to provide a re-interpretation of the juridical politics of the
hunger strike. Specifically, I proposed that there was a valid legal
foundation for the prisone'rs' claims that could be justified either by
reference to ancient Irish Brehon law, or to contemporary legal theory in the
259 This strategy is not unprecedented. In 1532 Franciscus de Victoria invoked the "Law of
Nations" in defence of Spain's colonization of "the Americas." See supra note 7 at 97108.
260 In fact there were several possible grounds upon which the prisoners could have chosen
to argue their claims in international law. First, they could have relied on Common
Article Three, Protocol I, to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S.
No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; 6 U.S.T.
3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 ; 6 U.S.T. 35 16, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287. Second, they could have invoked Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 openedfor signature Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977). Third,
they might have looked to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
opened for signature Jan. 27, 1977, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976). While some
commentators have expressed skepticism as to the potential success of such arguments
"Boyle et al., Ten Years, supra note 149 at 94-95; J.M. Spillane, "Terrorists and Special
Status: The British Experience in Northern Ireland" ( 1986) Hastings lnt'l. & Comp. L
Rev. 481," my main point remains that no such arguments were ever made to the
Commissioners. Therefore, for the Commissioners to pontificate ex cathedra without the
benefit of argument from the parties and without giving reasons for their determination
is arrogant, conceited and downright oppressive.
26 1 D. Carroll, "Rephrasing the Political With Kant and Lyotard: From Aesthetic to Political
Judgements" (1984) 14:3 Diacritics 74 at 78.
262 It may be appropriate to forestall a possible objection at this point. Some might argue
that this essay asks of deconstruction and postmodernism something t�at is
fundamentally alien to their perpetually critical disposition - reconstructive possibilities
- and therefore that they are being subjected to instrumental standards. In reply, this
essay adopts an anthropomorphic stance and argues that in politics and law the
benchmark is the diminution or exacerbation of domination and subordination. This point
will be elaborated in Part IV, A.
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form of "destabilization" or "solidarity" rights, or, Lyotardian injustice.
However, further consideration suggests that postmodernism and
deconstruction, if left unmodified, can cause some serious problems for, and
may even compromise, those who believe in progressive political practice.
To substantiate this essay's "attractive aversion"263 to postmodernism and
deconstruction, these possible limitations will be discussed under the
headings of: power, the text, practice and (in)justice; agency, power and
(un)truth; language and power; and, identity politics. In the course of my
arguments, I will attempt to rebut the potential postmodern accusation that
I, too, am caught with my modernist hands in the till.
A. Power, the Text, Practice and (ln)Justice
Postmodernism and deconstruction have implemented a dramatic
transformation in the analyses· and discourses of social theory, literary
criticism, philosophy, political theory and jurisprudence. Within modernist
and humanist approaches the analytical paradigm was very much organized
on the conceptual bases of "the author", "the individual", "intention",
"will", "consciousness", "subjectivity", "choice", "freedom", "autonomy"
and "rights." With the arrival of postmodernism, and its decomposition of
the "subject", the analytical paradigm has shifted to become preoccupied
with "language games", and in particular the ideas of "interpretation",
"narrative", "translation", "dialogue", "inscription", "meaning", and "herme
neutics." So, for example, Lyotard argues that in order to "understand-social
relations" what is needed is "a theory of games which accepts agnostics as
a founding principle", an '"atomization' of the social into flexible networks
of language games."264 Or, in Derrida's [in]famous phrase, "There is nothing
outside of the text."265
In so far as this latter proposition is understood as a pithy encapsulation
of the claim that the possibility of interpretation - indeed interpretations
- is always present, that essentialist and non-negotiable stances are
indefensible, then it is a salutary thesis. However, insofar as the discourse
of the "text" tends to become hegemonic, even a neo-metanarrative,266 and
not just a supplement to traditional modes of social, political and juridical
263 This oxymoronic idea· is culled from Theodor Adorno, see M. Jay, Adorno (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1984) at 14.
264 Condition, supra note I 9 at 16-17.
265 Grammatology, supra note 19 at 158- 159.
266 Tendencies in this direction are to be found, I would suggest, in Derrida's self
proclaimed "generalization [of the concept of text] almost without limit, in any case
without present or perceptible limit...." Derrida, "But Beyond", supra note 25 at 167.
Note also his faith in "a general law of differance". Derrida, Margins, supra note 99 at
15.
To be clear, my suggestion is not that Derrida is a textual reductionist; rather it is that
he over-emphasizes the possibilities of interpretation. Thus my critique avoids his
accusation that:
Every week I receive critical commentaries and studies on deconstruction which
operate on the assumption that what they call 'post-structuralism' amounts to saying
that there is nothing beyond language, that we are submerged in words - and other
stupidities of that sort.
Derrida, supra note 51 at 123.
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analysis, we encounter the problematic issue of the relationship between
texts and practices, or, more specifically, the relationship between structure
and agency. To concretize these quite abstract suggestions, I will focus my
discussion on Lyotard's and Derrida's respective conceptions of "justice"
and inquire as to what contribution they might make to understanding the
plight of the hunger strikers.
I will discuss Lyotard first because his work provides us with an
opportunity to consider one of postmodemism' s suggestions for
reconstructive reconsideration: the proposition that "justice as a value is
neither outmoded or suspect", that what is required is an "idea and practice
of justice that is not linked to that of consensus."267
As we have seen, to achieve a refurbishing of "justice" Lyotard advocates
"justice as paralogy"268 and "the multiplication of small narratives."269 His
conception of justice embraces the conflictual pluralism of language games
in which "to speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall
within the domain of a general agnostics."210 Or, as he continues, "this does
not necessarily mean that one plays to win."271
In the abstract, this conception of justice as "just gaming", as dissensus,
as the perennial play of incommensurability, sounds vaguely attractive. Its
pluralism and heterogeneity would appear to foster the flourishing of
difference and tolerance. However, when we think of justice in its concrete
and socially embodied form - that is, as law - what are the practical
consequences for a reconstruction of law? It is at this point that Lyotard's
use of "language games" or "narratives" as metaphors or analogies for the
forms of social interaction becomes shaky. Law is different
Although Lyotard makes much of the claim that each micro-discourse has
its own internal system of rules and norms, 272 he very rarely analyses in
detail the spheres of social interaction to which these micro-narratives might
pertain, or more importantly, what the particular rules of a specific micro
narrative might be. This omission is crucial for understanding the difference
of law because the very purpose of the rule of law is, literally, to rule, that
is, to determine the legitimacy of competing narratives, to valorize some
and to exclude others. In this light, it is important to revisit the way in
which Lyotard introduces the concept of "the differend":
[A] s distinguished from a litigation, a differend would be a case of c onflict,
between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of
a rul e of judgement applicable to both arguments. One side's legitimacy does
not imply the other's lack of legitimacy.273

But within the current politico-historical conjuncture, it falls to law to
267
268
269
270
271
272
273

Lyotard, Condition, supra note 19 at 66 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 60.
Gaming, supra note 70.
Id. at I 0.
Id.
Id. at 96.

Dijferend, supra note 70 at xi.
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provide "a rule of judgement", to be the final arbiter of disputes, to
determine in an authoritative and authoritarian way when the play of
narratives should cease. The rule of law, as the final source of legitimacy,
is the classic mastemarrative, even more so perhaps than science which was
Lyotard' s favoured example.
Now it may be that there is something of the prescriptive at work here, that
Lyotard is proposing that law, like every other narrative, should curtail its
hubris and thereby abdicate its determinative role. Again, at first blush, this
might seem pluralistically attractive, but further consideration gives rise to
concern. To posit that law should respond to, and respect the plurality of, nar
ratives assumes that different narratives have an equal opportunity to
articulate themselves, and to be understood. But surely this is a formal
conception of equality that ignores the inequalities of differently situated
"language games." The "narrative" of fasting based on the Brehon legal
tradition is simply "untranslatable" and unintelligible within a discursive
regime that has been colonized by a common law juridical psyche. To call on
law to surrender its hegemonic position is like asking a monopoly to volunt
arily surrender the marketplace pre-eminence that is its very raiso'! d 'etre.
Thus, it seems that somewhere along the way power - or at least a
certain type of power, the old-fashioned, relatively unsophisticated,
instrumentalist form of power as coercion, duress and violence - has been
factored out of the Lyotardian formula. How else is one to explain his
curious equation of fighting with game playing,274 rather than domination,
force and death. Law is a language game like no other: winning is all
important when the stakes are life or death.
To avoid this problem Lyotard attempts to delimit the scope of his thesis
of "language games." However, it is a limitation that, as I shall point out,
is unjustified within even his own terms of reference:
I am excl uding the case in which force operates by means of terror. This lies
outside the realm of language games, because the efficacy of such a force is
based entirely on the threat to elimi nate the opposing player, not on maki ng
a better "move" than he [sic). Whenever efficiency... is derived from a "Say
or do this, or else you' ll never speak again," then we are in the real m of
terror, and the social bond is destroyed. 275

Exactly. Law, in the current politico-historical conjuncture, is about the
efficiency of dispute resolution when the social bond is destroyed. Law is
a medium for the imposition of order when the incommensurability of social
practices can no longer be controlled by other means. Law is but the
constitutionalization of violence.276 The more problematic question,
274 Condition, supra note I 9 at I 0.
275 Id. at 46.
276 See Devlin, Law's Centaur, supra note 8. See also as Poulantzas points out:
State monopolized physical violence permanently underlies the techniques of power
and mechanisms of consent, it is inscribed in the web of disciplinary and ideological
devices; and even when it is not directly exercised, it shapes the materiality of the
body upon which domination is brought to bear.
N. Poulantzas, State, Power and Socialism (London: NLB, I 978) at 8.
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however, is: on what basis does Lyotard ground his claim that terror can
not be just another language game, or one of the rules of a particular
narrative? Surely, this exclusivist stipulation is begging the question,
packing the rules, so that Lyotard's conclusions are prefigured by his
definition. Thus, it seems to me that a discussion of justice that promises to
talk about "the practice of justice"277 but then fails to address the nature and
role of law is of little assistance to those who are the victims of law
because, overcome by juridical vertigo, it unpersuasively defines the
problem out of existence.
This ambivalence in Lyotard's position manifests itself in more concrete
forms elsewhere in his work, and has (potential) lessons for those who
might look to (his version of) postmodemism in support of their progressive
practice. In Just Gaming, Lyotard indicates that both the Vietnamese and
Algerians had "the right to rebel"278 because the forces of occupation denied
them entitlement to their own narratives. It would seem, then, that his
theory of justice countenances a right of rebellion against terror. But surely
rebellion, as war - and we are all somewhat familiar with the brutality of
the Vietnamese and Algerian wars - seeks to eliminate the "other", to have
as its primary concern that which Lyotard excludes from his theory of
language games: the aspiration to win.279 Given that "terror" is integral to
war and rebellion, what is the basis of the Lyotardian "right" to rebellion for
an indigenous narrative?
Moreover, in his later book, The Differend, Lyotard appears to retreat
from his thoughts on a right of rebellion when he asserts that, "proud
struggles for independence end in young reactionary states."280 This is a very
large empirical and normative claim, for which he provides no argument.
But even if it is true, the question remains: What are the colonized to do?
Talking it out - or agreeing to disagree - might be an attractive strategy
for the philosopher, but it is a feckless strategy for decolonization.281
Viewed in this light, Lyotard's conceptions of justice and injustice may
be useful insofar as they help to reinforce the critique of authoritative
power, and of the legitimizations that are offered for such power. However,
Condition, supra note 19 at 66.
Gaming, supra note 70 at 70.
Id. at 10.
Differend, supra note 70 at 181. For further indications of his ambivalences in relation
to Algeria, see Lyotard, Peregrinations, supra note 60 at 26-27.
281 A similar concern seems to underlie Derrida's thinking when he argues that:
[N]ot only is there no kingdom of differance, but differance instigates the subversion
of every kingdom. Which makes it obviously threatening [to] and infallibly dreaded
by everything within us that desires a kingdom.
Margins, supra note 99 at 22. It seems to me that both Lyotard and Derrida have a
legitimate concern: the perennial danger that the oppressed will, in turn, become an
oppressor. While I would not want to argue that two wrongs make a right, politics is
always a dangerous affair, and the colonized are, unfortunately, tainted by the power of
the oppressor and therefore rarely innocent. (For example, during the course of the
prisoners' protests, several prison officers were killed by the I.R.A.). But to leave
colonization in its place because there are no guarantees hardly seems to be progressive
or "revolutionary". And besides, historically, it is difficult to find a colonizer who has
voluntarily surrendered its power.
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they do not enable Lyotard to empower the dispossessed with a normative
discourse or practice to advance their vision.
Derrida, in my opinion, fares somewhat, but not enormously, better.
While it would be both a mistake, I think, and unfair, I am sure, to read
Derrida as arguing that there are no extra interpretive practices,282 his work
in the main (and in spite of himself) remains hostage to the metaphor of the
textuality of social relations and, as a consequence, is both enigmatic and
distant from pressing practical engagements.
In a recently published essay - Force of Law: The "Mystical
Foundations of Authority"283 - Derrida directly addresses the questions of
law and justice. Derrida divides his analysis into three sections. The first is
a discussion of the interaction between justice, violence, law and
deconstruction. The second performs a deconstructive reading of an essay
by Walter Benjamin284 by means of which Derrida further interrogates the
relationship between law and violence. The third section, a postscript,
considers the relationship between Benjamin's essay and Nazism.
There is much in Derrida's essay that is commendable in its
"problematization of the foundations of law; morality and politics."285
Central to Derrida's argument is the disassociation of "law" and "justice"
on the basis that the former is deconstructible whereas the latter is not:
I . The deconstructibility of law . .. , of legality, legitimacy or l egitimation
makes deconstruction possible.
2. The undeconstructibility ofjustice also makes deconstruction possible, indeed
is inseparable from it.
3 . The result: deconstruction takes place in the interval that separates the
undeconstructibility of j ustice from the deconstructibility of droit....286

Or, as he states more pithily, "deconstruction is justice."287 The justification
for this proposition is to be found in Derrida's vision of justice which he
variously conceptualizes as "an aporia", "the incalculable", "the unde
cidable", "an experience of the impossible", "infinite" and "heterogeneous
and heterotropic."288 In short, for Derrida, justice is an always already
deferred, an ungraspable yearning, a "yet-to-come (avenir)."289
The advantage of this sundering of the conventional identification of law
with justice is that it enables him to advance the proposition that "law [is
282 Derrida has claimed that deconstruction is a "practico-political" stance, J. Derrida, The
Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. A. Bass, (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1 987) at 508 and he has explicitly recognized that there is "a field of
non-discursive forces". Margins, supra note 99 at 329. See also Norris, Derrida, supra
note 100 at 122, 142.
283 Force, supra note 10.
284 W. Benjamin, "Critique of Violence" in P. Dementz, ed., Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms
and Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 1986) at 277.
285 "Force", supra note 10 at 931.
286 Id. at 945.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 947, 959, 963.
289 Id. at 993.
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a] violence without ground",290 or, as one commentator has more graphically
suggested, "law is a masquerade of violence."291 At times, and seemingly at
odds with Lyotard, he even appears (obliquely) to believe in a right to
revolution.292 Moreover, and as against those who charge deconstruction
with nihilism, throughout the essay Derrida is at pains to emphasize the
connection between deconstruction and "intervention", "transformation" and
"emancipation."293 He even suggests that deconstruction can engender a
"sense of responsibility without limits."294
However, despite the fact that Derrida's essay serves reasonably well as
a "critique of juridical ideology, a desedimentation of the superstructures of
law",295 it seems to me that the self-confessed "guardedness"296 of his
approach renders him incapable of justifying any of these responsible,
interventionist, transformative and emancipatory activities. Even more
importantly, I fear that aspects of his argument preclude the oppressed.from
adopting a discourse by which they can justify their resistance, their
revolutionary behaviour.
As a logical consequence of his always and already deferred conception
of justice (his thesis that justice is a future possibility always presently
impossible) Derrida argues that "one cannot speak directly about
justice...say 'this is just' and even less 'I am just', without immediately
betraying justice."297 Now, in one sense, given the forum and the audience298
(as well as the principle of charity in interpretation), what Derrida is arguing
has merit in that it appears to be an attempt to curtail the self-righteous
conceit and arrogance of the already powerful. But (perhaps unintentionally)
excluded from his analysis when he advances such a claim is "an/other"
constituency: the disempowered. So what are the victims of oppression to
do if they cannot directly appeal to justice? Can they provide any
justification for their anti-colonial struggles that would not be subject to the
tu quoque argument? Thus, ironically, it seems that the powerful come out
ahead even when they are the subject of Derridean critique because their
hegemony enables them to structurally determine the terrain of his
discourse. In his haste to thwart the powerful, Derrida, with an excessive
stroke of his deconstructive pen, may further disempower the already
oppresssed.
Furthermore, there is a curious - or perhaps more accurately, disturbing
- process at work in Derrida's thesis that deconstruction is justice. It seems
to me that in order to retain the integrity of his favoured (non)concept,
"deconstruction", Derrida makes it a cognate of "justice." "Justice" - like
290 Id. at 943.
29 1 D. Cornell, "The Violence of the Masquerade: Law Dressed Up as Justice" (1990) 11
Cardozo L. Rev. 1047.
292 "Force", supra note 10 at 993.
293 Id. at 931, 933, 954.
294 Id. at 953.
295 Id. at 941.
296 Id. at 929.
297 Id. at 935, 963.
298 J. Derrida, "Force of Law : The 'Mystical Foundations of Authority "' . (Paper presented
as keynote address, Benjamin Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University, New York).
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deconstruction - is then said to be "undecon·structible." But in order to
maintain this stance, "justice" is then blessed with an elusive and evasive
uality, reifiedalmost (transcendental even?), so that it cannot be
---------------q
"betrayed."299 The consequence is that "justice" is beatified; it is given a
value superior to that of those who might need to invoke it: the .
dispossessed. Such seems to be the logic of what might be called "the fear
of besmirchment."
To be fair to Derrida, he is aware of the problem of immediate political
praxis and he counsels that an adoption of his conception of justice "cannot
and should not serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles,
within an institution or a state or bet.ween one institution or state and
others."300 But how is one to know that s/he is doing the right thing in the
absence of justice? How is one to determine if one's acts are interventionist,
transformative and responsible? The only direction we receive from Derrida
. that appears to go beyond this formalistic call to participate is his comment
that "[n]othing seems to me less outdated than the classic emancipatory
ideaI."301 But, in a sense, this only further complicates matters for even the
most superficial familiarity with the history of political thought recognizes
that "emancipation" is a profoundly indeterminate term, invoked, for
example, by Marxists and conservatives, colonizers and the colonized. To
replace the concept of "justice" with the essentially contested concept of
"emancipation", without any substantiation of what the latter term might
mean, seems to be an unfortunate shell game.
These concerns are intensified when we review Derrida's deconstruction
of Benjamin's Critique of Violence. The primary focus of Derrida's
deconstruction is the distinction Benjamin draws between "founding" (law
giving) and "conserving" (law-preserving) violence, the former which
Benjamin appears to justify, the latter which he appears to condemn.
Derrida's familiar point is that such a sharp distinction is indefensible in
that each form of violence contaminates the other3°2 and, consequently, that
it is impossible to categorically justify one but ·not the other. Derrida's
argument seems to be that the quest for origins or foundations is but a
manifestation of the bete noir of western thought: logocentrism, the
metaphysics of presence. But surely, those who are involved in anticolonial
struggles need to be able to point to an alternative origin, a competing
discourse (in this case lrish self-determination) to justify their revolutionary
practices.303
Derrida, however, seems to suggest that this is an illegitimate position to
adopt because if such movements are truly revolutionary then their
299
300
301
302
303

"Force", supra note 10 at 935.

Id. at 971.

Id. at 97 I.
Id. at 997, 1007.

"Origins" in this sense is not to be understood as essential or foundational in a
philosophical sense. Origins, as used here, is a historic\zed concept, as pan of an
oppositional discourse, as a dangerous politicizing supplement: "as a revolutionary
chance in the fight for the oppressed past." W. Benjamin, Illuminations H. Arendt, ed.,
trans. H. Zohn (New York: Brace and World Inc., 1968) at 253-264.
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discourse and violence depend upon the achievement of that which they
aspire to, something that is not yet. Justification, Derrida argues, can only
be ex post:
A "successful" revolution, the "successful foundation of a State (in somewhat
the same sense that one speaks of a "felicitous" performative speech act) will
produce apres coup what it w as destined in advance to produce, namely,
proper interpretive models to read in return, to give sense, necessity and
above all legitimacy to the violence that h as produced, among others, the
interpretive model in question, that is, the discourse of self-legitimation.
Exampl es of this circle, this other hermeneutic circle, are not lacking ...
whether it's a question of what happens from one neighbourhood to another,
one street to another i n a great metropolis or from one country or one camp
to another around a world war in the course of which States and nations are
founded, destroyed or redesigned. There are cases in which it is not known
for generations if the performati ve of the violent founding of a state is
"felicitous" or not.304

I think that this is where Derrida's reliance on hermeneutic metaphors
encounters profound problems. Revolutionary practice is worlds away_ from
"performative speech acts." Revolutionaries, in order to have any chance of
success, require an immediate - even if contaminated - discourse to
mobilize support for their emancipatory practice. Revolutionaries have to
know, and they have to be able to convince their potential supporters, that
they are justified in their actions. People who go on hunger strike may
require the discourse of justice not only to galvanize solidarity with their
communities, but also to reflect upon the appropriateness of their own
decisions. They need to be able to directly argue that their acts are "just."
The oppressed need justice in a multitude of ways.305 Derrida's elusive
theory of justice denies them that resource.
The foregoing references to "solidarity" lead to a final potential problem
with Derrida's essay. At several points, Derrida argues that the concern of
justice is with "singularity" and "individuals"306 which, in my opinion, is
problematic for two reasons. First, it fits very uncomfortably with Derrida's
propositions elsewhere that seem to underplay the concept of "the subject."
This is a point I shall return to in the next section. Second, the valorization
of singularity tends to exclude group-based concerns (for example,
nationalism) and therefore potentially devalues solidarity.307 This will be
discussed further in Part V, D.
In sum, as a method of understanding, explanation and politicization, I
304 "Force", supra note 10 at 993.
305 See also V. Havel, 'The Power of the Powerless", J. Keane, ed., The Power of the
Powerless (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1985).
306 "Force", supra note 10 at 949, 955.
307 In one of these references to singularity, Derrida does in fact mention "groups", but
qualifies it with the modifier "irreplaceable", without elaborating on the significance of
such a term, id. at 949. It does suggest that groupism or groupist-based claims in and
of itself or themselves is/are not a concern of justice.
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would argue that while the characterization of socio-legal relations in
literary terms may have its strengths, it also has its weaknesses. Having put
"the Word in its place",308 both Derrida and Lyotard seem to have become
trapped in the metaphor of the text, allowing it to take on a dynamic of its
own, conceding to it a potentially canonical status, thereby infusing their
analyses "with the ethico-political ambiguity" of which Derrida accuses
Benjamin.309 In other words, while discourse is a manifestation of power, it
is not the only manifestation of power, and indeed is, in many ways,
circumscribed and constituted by instrumental and institutional power.
Accordingly, while supplements may be dangerous to the dominant
discourse, they may be even rnore dangerous for those who articulate them;
for, the price of speaking as "the other" may be the destruction of the
speaker. The differential play of "endless ... reversals and counter-rever
sals"3 '0 comes to an abrupt halt when one of the reversals becomes too
dangerous. In short, death makes a difference.
B. Agency, Power and (Un)Truth
There is, of course, an obvious postmodern response to the critique I have
advanced: that my argument privileges consciousness and therefore smacks
of a revivalist and revolutionary voluntarism that is dependent upon an
idealistic and nostalgic humanism. Nationalism, after all, is but a by-product
of modernity and modernist thinking3 " and its embracement can lead to a
crude nativism.312 More specifically, the postmodernist counterargument
might suggest that the fasting prisoners were but the "effect",313 "site",314
determination or symptom of the various discourses and structures of Irish
Republicanism: "slave(s) of language."315 They were inscriptions of a
deviationist subtext, not authors of their destiny. De Man would call my
reversal of cause and effect metalepsis.316
.Derrida may be particularly skeptical of the sort of argument which I am
attempting to advance given that he has been quite explicit in his
displacement of "the subject." For example, at one point, he argues that "the
subject" is but "the play of linguistic or semiological differance"317 and, at
308 D. Hebdige, Hiding in the Light: On Images and Things (New York: Routledge, 1988)
at 226.
309 "Force", supra note 10 at 1025.
310 "Deconstructive Practice", supra note 24 at 764.
311 See e.g., J. Lyotard, "Rudiments Paiens" (1977) at 145 quoted in Bennington, supra note
251 at 52-53.
312 T. Niranjana, Siting Translation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 992) 166169.
3 I 3 Derrida, for example, posits that consciousness is "a determination" or an "effect",
Margins, supra note 99 at 16. For a similar construction of the subject see Positions,
supra note 94 at 122 and Speech, supra note 99 at 147. Foucault argues that "the man
described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already himself the effect of a
subjection much more profound than himself." M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The
Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 1 977) at 30.
3 14 Ferry & Renaud, supra note 243 at 209; Schlag, "Le Hors", supra note 24 at I 671.
315 J. Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977) at 148.
316 P. De Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Russeau, Nietzsche, Rilke and
Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) at 274.
317 Speech, supra note 99 at 146.

60

Windsor Yearbook ofAccess to Justice

1 994

another, he posits that "the authority of representation constrains us,
imposing itself on our thought through a whole dense, enigmatic and
heavily stratified history. It programs us and precedes us."3 1 8 More
expansively:
[T] he subj ect (in its identity with itself, or eventually in its consciousness of its
identity with itself, its self consciousness) is inscribed in language, is a ' function'
of language, becomes a speaking subj ect only by maki ng its speech conform even in so-called ' creation', or in so called ' transgression' - to the system of the
rules of language as a system of differences, or at the very least by· conforming
to the general law of differance. 319

And, with admirable antilogocentric consistency, Derrida confesses his own
lack of agency by denying that he chooses interpretations, rather "the
interpretations select themselves."320
In relation to something like the hunger strike, this espousal of structural
determinism, this deconstructive effacement of the distinction between
subject and object, is an attractive thesis in that it seems to explain that
which is apparently so eccentric as to be inexplainable: the self-sacrifice of
the self in full knowledge of the likelihood of death. However, the problems
with an adoption of this postmodern approach to the question of the subject
are twofold. First, it is insufficiently oppositional in its politico-juridical
orientation because it fails to analyse the ways in which even the oppressed
can find room to manoeuvre, and therefore resist. Second, by trivializing
oppositional agency it potentially reinforces continued oppression. I will
elaborate on both of these arguments in tum.
1. Explaining Room to Maneuver
My first concern about an excessively passive theory of the subject
suggests that, in its best light, postmodemism provides little account of how
the oppressed actually determine their condition, make choices and resist
domination.321 In its worst light, it considers the oppressed to be dupes or
3 18 J. Derrida, "Sendin: On Representation" (1982) 49 Social Research 294 at 304.
And Baudrillard harmonizes:
Far from the individual expressing his needs in the economic system, it is the
economic systeni that induces the individual function and the parallel functionality of
objects and needs. The individual is an ideological structure, a historical form
correlative with the commodity form (exchange value) and the object form (use
value). The individual is nothing but the subject thought in economic terms,
rethought, simplified and abstracted by the economy. The entire history of
consciousness and ethics (all the categories of occidental psychometaphysics) is only
the history of the political economy o f the subject.
J. Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (St. Louis, Mo.: Telos
Press, 198 1) at 1 33.
319 Margins, supra note 99 at 15. See also Positions, supra note 94 at 28-29.
320 J. Derrida, "Interview" ( 1980) 14 Literary Rev. 2 1.
321 For further discussions of resistance see e.g., B. Moore Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases
of Obedience and Revolt (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); Scott, supra note 127; P.
Ewick & S. Silbey, "Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal
Consciousness" ( 1992) 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 73 1 ; A. Sarai, " 'The Law is All Over' :
Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor" ( 1990) 2 Yale J.
Law & Hum. at 343.
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automatons. The sort of propositions advanced by Derrida run the risk of
oversimplifying the relationship between agency and structure, of merely
inverting the humanist hierarchy of agency over structure and, therefore,
simply mimicking it.322 But perhaps this goes too far and what is required
is mediation between structure and agency, so that Liberal humanism's
ontological fetishization of the sovereign subject is not replaced by an
excessive and reactive anti-humanism, 323 thereby causing postmodernism to
slip into an anti-theory of self-hood and agency.
There is a difference between a "sovereignself', a "situated self' and a
"saturated self." The sovereign vision of the self endorses an a priori
conception of subjecthood, where a person is assumed to be solitary,
unified, rational and voluntaristic: "man [sic] as the· master and possessor
of the totality of his actions and ideas."324 Such an ontology dovetails with
a liberal humanist philosophy. The saturated conception of the self endorses
a concatenated vision of subject, where the person is assumed to be a
forcefield of structural determinants and discursive practices. 325 Such a
postmodernist ontology calls into question the possibility of self-reflective,
self-constitution. The situated vision of the self advocates an embedded
conception of the subject which allows for the possibility of consciousness
and self-constiiution in the context of the matrix of societal and cultural
influences. This vision of the subject - which might also be called a
"protean_ subject" - acknowledges the significance of structural factors in
the "development" of the subject, but still maintains a sense of the subject
as a potential, "the infinite within the finite."326 Such a reconstructed
conception of the subject has no necessary substantive characteristics (and
in that sense it can be said to be ontologically thin) and is responsive to
formative discourses (and in that sense it can be understood as non
individualistic and relational) but can still be understood as potentially
agentic. 327
In other words, what is required is a relational and historicized theory of
the subject and a relational and historicized conception of agency. Such an
ontology envisions the subject as neither the centre of the universe, nor a
mere pastiche of social forces, but a subject who is both constituted and
constitutive.328
322 It also suggests a return to a dualistic either/or which is normally anathema to
deconstructive thought.
323 Ferry & Renaut, supra note 243.
324 Id. at xvi.
325 For example, Baudrillard argues that so pervasive is the power of the object, all our
options are precoded or predetermined, Simulations, supra note 42 at 111-1 17.
326 R.M. Unger, Passion: An Essay on Human Personality (New York: Free Press, 1984).
327 But see contra, "Le Hors", supra note 24 at 1668-1674 for a critique of what Schlag
calls "the relatively autonomous self'.
328 Seyla Benhabib posits that, "vis a vis our own stories we are in the position of author
and character at once", "Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance" ( I991) 11
Praxis International I 37 at 140.
For the sake of completeness it should be pointed out that, on occasion, Derrida hints
at such a situated conception of the subject. See-e.g., his proposition that "(t)he subject
is absolutely indispensable. I don't destroy the subject, I situate it", E. Donato & R.
Macksey, eds., The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Critism and the
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These abstract propositions may have some concrete purchase. There is
little doubt that Republicanism as a discourse is an important factor in Irish
life, but it is not so determinative or constraining as postmodernists might
have us believe. Republicanism in the late 1970s and early 1980s underwent
a significant transition from its traditional politically abstentionist and
exclusively militaristic form, to a politically participatory and more social
movement. Postmodern methodology might enable us to track this transition
by encouraging us to look at the microdetails of this development. In
particular, we would have to analyse the changing subjectivities and
emerging ideologies of actors such as Gerry Adams329 and Bobby Sands330
- Irish, Belfast-reared, male, working class, (a)religious - and the
differences of opinion within the Army Council of the IRA. Most
particularly, we can learn from "the comms" that were smuggled out of the
H-Blocks prior to, and during, the fast. These are perhaps the classic
postmodern deviationist microtexts in that as much as 4,000 words331 could
be written with a biro refill tube on one cigarette paper or "stamped
government property toilet roll."332 These "hidden transcripts"333 would then
be smuggled to the outside world through bodily orifices - themselves
penetratingly surveilled334 - thereby enabling the prisoners to implement
a change of direction and determine a future agenda for Republicanism. 335
By means of these "comms" the prisoners disseminated an alternative
political vision for the IRA and even outlined the most appropriate
strategies of mobilization, froin massive postering campaigns to the
nomination of fasting prisoners as election candidates.336

329

330
331
332
333
334

335
336

Sciences of Han (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) at 271. The problem, as I have
noted in the text, is that the preponderance of his analyses - many of which were
written after this comment - cut in the other direction.
In recent years, Adams has become increasingly explicit about the socialist orientation
of Sinn Fein. "We believe that a system of socialism in Ireland should be tailored to
meet Irish needs", interview with Magill, March 1989, Dublin. See also, Keena, supra
note 126.
Feldman, supra note 138 at 162-163, 213 makes some efforts in this direction.
Id. at 199.
Sands, 'Things Remain the Same - Torturous", Skylark, supra note 1 at 131.
Scott, supra note 127 at xii, 25.
So creative were the prisoners that they also smuggled in tobacco, biro pen refills, flints,
quartz crystal radios, cameras and even a gun (suitably broken down) via their orifices.
The parts of their bodies adapted to these practices of resistance included their ears,
nose, mouth, navels, foreskins, pubic hair and, most commonly, anus. See Bishop &
Mallie, supra note 123 at 276 and Beresford, supra note 3 at 63.
Feldman, supra note 138 at 161-163, 219-222.
See for example, the "comm" reproduced in Clarke, supra note 154, Appendix I at 242.
Another point may also be worth noting. Like many revolutionary organizations,
traditionally, the IRA has been highly centralized and undemocratic in• its structure.
"Volunteers", as passified subjects, take orders; they do not set policy. So, too, do
prisoners. But the imprisonment period of the 1970' s engendered a transformation of the
form of the organization and the prisoners became more agentic. Through their
conversations, debates and reflections on "the struggle", the prisoners rejected the idea
that the vanguard elite of the Army Council of the IRA in its converitional militaristic
wisdom knew best. Consequently, the IRA became more open, democratic and
participatory, enabling the prisoners to envision new strategies, creating in embryonic
form an innovative political structure. This would eventually filter out and up to the
leadership and eventually .re-orient the political strategy and reconfigure the political
processes of the republican movement.
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As the late 1970s wore on, it became increasingly apparent to the
prisoners that, despite some outside support, their various protests were not
going to change the British state's determination to impose criminalization,
nor generate further support for "political status" in the nationalist
community. The terrain of struggle was significantly enlarged when the
prisoners, against the advice of the Army Council, decided that by means
of a hunger strike there could be a galvanization of the nationalist
community around republicanism. In other words, it was determined by the
prisoners that the traditionally sanctified unidimensional military campaign
could not succeed. Although the first couple of weeks of the fast expanded
the support network, the majority of the nationalist community remained
leery. The key breakthrough occurred when it was decided ( once again by
the fasting prisoners)337 that the traditional republican position of
abstentionism from political campaigns should be abandoned and it was
proposed to run Bobby Sands as the candidate for the British Parliament in
the constituency of Fermanagh-South Tyrone. This strategy forced the issue
within the nationalist community as to whether it would split the vote
between the republican, Sands, and the Social Democratic and Labour Party
(SDLP) candidate,338 and thereby let the single Unionist candidate win. The
SDLP backed down, giving the full nationalist stage to Sands. The result
was that on April 9th, 1 9 8 1 , a self confessed IRA volunteer was elected to
the British Parliament with 30,492 votes. There was a boomerang effect.
Criminalization as a strategy of delegitimization was in shambles, and the
British could no longer credibly claim that the IRA had no local support. 339
Furthermore, the election of two more of the fasting prisoners in a
general election in the Republic of Ireland a few months later was crucial
to the defeat of the governing party, Fianna Fail.340 Moreover, with Sands'
election to Parliament, international attention was focused not only on the
strike, but on the whole issue of Britain: s occupation of Northern Ireland.341
Finally, the strike and the events around it_ indicated that the traditional
Republican stance of political abstentionism in deference to militarism was
337 Bishop & Mallie, supra note 123 at 291.
338 The S.D.L.P. is the preferred party of liberal nationalists. It advocates a constitutional
route to a re-unification of Ireland.
339 British interpretations have always attempted to portray the IRA as marginal to the
nationalist community of Northern Ireland, devoid of popular support. See e.g., P. Jay,
Letter to the Editor, Washington Post, (November 1978), describing the IRA as a "small
group of armed terrorists", quoted in Coogan, Blanket, supra note 157 at 171. Or again,
even after Sands' election to the British Parliament, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord
Carrington, continued to protest, "Do not tell me the IRA represents people in Northern
Ireland. ... They have no status, they are not accepted by anyone", quoted in Beresford,
supra note 3 at 97. At the same time, however, the Foreign Office, through an agent
called Mountain Climber, was clandestinely negotiating with the leadership of the IRA
to see if a resolution to the hunger strike could be achieved. Id. at 3-5, 225-230, 249254.
340 Kelley, supra note 165 at 341; Coogan, IRA, supra note 159 at 631.
341 Curtis, supra note 167. For a more detailed account of international support and media
coverage, see Feehan, supra note 166 at 20-23, 139. It might also be worth noting that
during the hunger strike, financial support for the IRA from the United States is
estimated to have increased from approximately $160,000 per year to $888,000. Bishop
& Mallie, supra note 123 at 235.
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misconceived. The fast served as a catalyst for Sinn Fein to participate in
subsequent local, general and European elections where it obtained between
10.2% and 13.4% of the overall vote, or between 25% to 40% of the
Nationalist vote in Northern Ireland.342 Small wonder then that the British
foreign office, when briefing young diplomats on Irish history, considers the
hunger strike to be "an unmitigated disaster."343 The prisoners negated the
negation.344 Resistance though marginal, suitably engendered, can erupt in
pheno_menal ways.345
This apprehension about the progressive political utility of deconstruction
and postmodernism is intensified when one reviews some of the more
explicitly "political work" of Derrida and Baudrillard: the former is
disturbingly equivocal as to the political ramifications of his own project
and the latter endorses a dangerous political quietism. Because of their
passive conception of the subject, neither theorist seems to be sufficiently
attuned to what I would describe as the noisy agency of the subjugated, but
not totally erased, subject.
It might be contended that it is unfair to complain about Derrida's
political progressivism, given that in 1983 he wrote a short essay which
challenged not only apartheid but also the West's complicity in its
perpetuation.346 Moreover, apparently in reply to those who have voiced
concerns about the political insignificance of deconstruction, he has argued
(with uncharacteristic clarity) that:
[W]hat is somewhat h astily called deconstruction is not, if it is of any
consequence, a specialized set of discursive procedures , even less the rules
of a new h ermeneutic method, working on texts or utterances in the shelter
of a given and stable institution. It is also, at the very least, a way of taking
a position, in its work o f analysis, concerning the political and institutional
structures that make possible and govern our practice, our competencies, our
performances. Precisel y because it is never concerned only with signified
342 For discussions of Sinn Fein's subsequent electoral forays see Clarke, supra note 154
at 211-219; Coogan, IRA, supra note 159 at 632-633; Keena, supra note 126 at 106,
109, 120, 127, 132-134.
343 Beresford, supra note 3 at 331.
344 This account of the mobilization of nationalists also challenges Baudrillard's assertion
that, "indifference of the masses is their true, their only practice ... the brute fact ... of
a refusal to participate in the recommended ideas, however enlightened". Or again, his
proposition that "at no time are the masses politically or historically engaged in a
conscious manner. They have only ever done so out of perversity, in complete
irresponsibility", Shadow, supra note 42 at 14, 38.
345 The costs are, of course, potentially very high. Not only did ten prisoners die, four of
the organizers of the National H Block/Armagh Committee were assassinated and three
others were seriously wounded. Nine prison officers were killed by the IRA in the latter
half of the 1970's.
346 J. Derrida, "Racism's Last Word" (1985) 12 Critical Inquiry 290. This essay generated
a critical response from A. McLintock & R. Nixon, "No Names Apart: The Separation
of Word and History in Derrida's 'Le Dernier Mot du Racism "' (1986) 13 Critical
Inquiry 140. In turn, this received a very harsh - even vicious - response from
Derrida: "But, Beyond..." (1986) 13 Critical Inquiry 155 [hereinafter "But Beyond"].
This last essay is particularly confusing in that Derrida invokes and relies upon concepts
such as "truth", "countertruth", "reality", and even a most curious "most evident
meaning", id. at 166, 156, 160.
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content, deconstruction should not be separable from this politico- institutional
problematic and should seek a new investigation of responsibility, an
investigation which questions the codes inherited from ethics and politics.
This means that too political for some, it will seem p aralyzing to these who
only recognize politics by the most familiar road signs.347

While this seems to be an unequivocal articulation of the political
ramifications of deconstruction, it is, in my opinion, vitiated in two ways.
First, the comment lacks any specificity as to what might qualify as an
acceptable "position" or appropriate "responsibility." The abstraction of the
argument renders it indeterminate and therefore potentially as supportive of
oppressive political practices as liberationist political practices. Second, on
what basis are we to justify any "position" that we might "choose" - or is
it that such positions might "choose" themselves348 - if deconstruction has
as its primary purpose displacement and the proliferation of multiplicity?
Indeed, despite these claims of deconstruction's political relevance, on
other occasions Derrida has also expressed reservations: "I must confess
that I have never succeeded in directly relating deconstruction to existing
political programmes."349 But, he then proceeds to argue that this does not
require inaction or non-commitment:
But the difficulty is to gesture in opposite d irections at the same time: on the one
hand to preserve a distance and suspicion with regard to the official political
codes governing reality; on the other, to intervene here and now in apractical and
engaged manner whenever the necessity arises. Thisposition ofdual allegiance,
in which Ipersonal ly find myself, is one ofperpetual uneasiness. I try where I can
to act politically while recognizing that such action remains incommensurate
with my intellectual project of deconstruction.350

And to be fair, it must be acknowledged that Derrida the int�rventionist351
has taken some progressive political positions. For example, in 1981 he
visited Prague to meet with some dissident intellectuals. For his troubles he
was arrested and jailed for three days. But what did Derrida the decon
structionist philosopher make of his experience? As one commentator
reports, Derrida:
347 Quoted in R. Bernstein, The New Constellation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) 186-187.
See also Derrida, Positions, supra note 94, where he proclaims, "I have always insisted
on the value practice", id. at 89.
348 See infra V, B.
349 Dialogue with Jacques Derrida in R. Kearney, ed., Dialogues with Contemporary
Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1984) at 119.
350 Id. at 120. The last sentence of this quotation displays a couple of interesting and
contestable assumptions. First, the posposition "I try where I can" seems to resurrect the
voluntaristic sovereign subject. Second, Derrida also seems to assume that there is a
sharp distinction between the political and the non-political, that his philosophy is
apolitical. Much of contemporary progressive theory would reject such a distinction and
endorse the maxim "that it is all politics".
351 "Deconstruction, I have insisted, is not neutral. It intervenes". Derrida, Positions, supra
note 94 at 93 (emphasis in original).
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insisted on the difficulty there is in making an ethico- political gesture (supporting
the resistance of the Prague philosophers, who demand respect for human rights
... and articulate that with a philosophy of the subject, the person, individual
liberty etc.) coincide with a philosophical labour governed by the necessity of
deconstructing precisely such philosophemes. 352

Viewed in this light, political prisoners in British occupied Northern
Ireland could expect little in the way of support from "revolutionary"
deconstruction, except perhaps a passing mention in a law review
article.353
Nor is Derrida alone in his quietism, in the retreat from the discussion of
praxis. 354 Baudrillard, too, has suggested that given the pervasiveness of
hyperreality and hyperconformity,355 "withdrawing into the private could
well be a direct defiance of the political, a form of actively resisting
political manipulation."356 For Baudrillard "indifference", inertia and non
participation are the only available "counter-strategies": 357
This revolution by involution . . . proceeds b y i nertia and not from a new and
j oyous negativity. It is silent and involutive - exactly the reverse of all
speechmaking and consciousness raising. It has no meaning, it has nothing
to say to us. 358

Yet again, events in the H-Blocks problematize the validity and utility of
such a celebration of the politics of silence. It was not that the prisoners had
"nothing to say"; rather, it was that they had "no say."359 As pointed out
352 T. Keenan, "Reading Foucault on a Bias" (1987) 15 Political Theory 5 at 19.
353 "Force", supra note 10 at 997.
354 Consider the following quotation from Lyotard on his thesis of "justice as paralogy":
And the idea that I think we need today in order to make decisions in political matters
cannot be the idea of totality, or of the unity, of the body. It can only be the idea of
multiplicity or of a diversity. Then the question arises: How can a regulatory use of
this idea of the political take place? How can it be pragmatically efficacious...? ls a
politics regulated by such an idea of multiplicity possible? Is it possible to decide in
a just way in, and according to, this multiplicity? And here I must say that I don't
know.
Lyotard, Gaming, supra note 70 at 94.
355 Baudrilliard, Shadow, supra note 42 at 41.
356 Id. at 39 (emphasis in original).
357 Id. at 105.
358 Id. at 49. And, with perfect consistency, he has made this apolitical project his personal
stance, freely admitting his own political disaffection, disenchantment, marginality and
irrelevance, J. Baudrillard, "Intellectuals, Commitment and Political Power" (1984-85)
11 Thesis Eleven at 166.
On occasion, Derrida also espouses the embracement of silence. For example, in his
support of Art Against Apartheid, he concludes, perhaps a little melodrammatically:
Beyond a continent whose limits they point to...the paintings gaze and call out in
silence. And their silence is just. A discourse would once again compel us to reckon
with state force and law.... This silence calls out unconditionally; it keeps watch on
that which is not yet, and on the chance of still remembering some faithful day.
Derrida, But Beyond..., supra note 346 at 299.
359 M. Henderson, "Speaking in Tongues: Dialogics Dialectics, and the Black Woman
Writer's Tradition", Theorize, supra note 52, 144 at 15 I. As a father of a fasting
prisoner said, prior to his son's death, "My son is no dupe, he understands clearly what
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previously, one reason the British government sought to enforce the cell
system of incarceration was to undermine the collectivism and solidarity
fostered in the dormitory-type cages of Long Kesh. The H-Blocks were
originally designed to accommodate one prisoner per cell and prisoners, on
entering, for the first year or so, were subjected to a rigorous regime of
silence: 360 communication with their colleagues was prohibited. Such a
strategy of isolation and individualization was tailored to reinforce the
project of criminalization. "Solitude", as Foucault reminds us, "is the
primary condition of total submission."361 But rather than being "dumb like
beasts",362 the prisoners resisted, both instrumentally and structurally.
Instrumentally, they began to communicate with each other by tapping on
the heating pipes, exchanging "comms" at the we:ekly mass (one of the few
opportunities for interaction) and by gradually reviving the Irish language.
Structurally, the nature of the "dirty protest" forced the prison authorities
to periodically hose down the cells to prevent diseases. Consequently, one
of the arms of the H had to be kept vacant in order to relocate the prisoners
to that section while the other was being cleaned. 363 This, in conjunction
with the very high imprisonment rates generated by the Diplock court
system,364 created an overpopulation problem for the prison administration
which was "solved" by putting two prisoners in most cells. The result was
to undermine the original plan for a regime of silence. It was this
reconsolidation of collectivism that engendered the group solidarity
necessary to sustain the "blanket", "no wash" and "dirty" protests and,
eventually, to plan and pursue the. hunger strike. It was only during the fast
itself that the silence re-emerged, for, as one ex-prisoner has put it:
The slagging and practical joking stopped during the hunger strike. I minded
Bobby [Sands] sayi ng the joking shouldn' t decrease. B ut i t was dead a rtificial.
There was no fucking singso ngs. We tried but it wouldn' t work. Bobby had asked
us not to get into the silence. We were all in mourning for the duratio n.365

Moreover, and as a further example of how the prisoners refused to be
passive, we can consider how they mobilized time against space. 366 As
previously pointed out, imprisonment generally, and the H-Blocks

360
361
362
363
364
365

366

he is doing and the consequences of his action", quoted in Clarke, supra note 154 at
184.
Feldman, supra note 138 at 157.
Foucault traces the importance of isolation to English penological thought as far back
as 1775. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1972) at 123-124, 237.
Baudrillard, Shadow, supra note 42 at 315.
Feldman, supra note 138 at 186.
Supra note 150.
Feldman, supra note 138 at 247. This is not to deny that there may be situations when
silence may be the most appropriate and effective way of resisting, for example, during
interrogation. See id. at 138. But to counsel, as Baudrillard seems to, the adoption of
silence as an overall strategy would, I believe, be disastrous for progressive political
practice.
For a further discussion of the relationship between time, space and resistance, see Sarat,
supra note 321 at 347-348.
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specifically, attempted to construct the prisoners' space in such a way as to
undermine their capacity for resistance and to cut them off from the outside
world. In partial response, the prisoners turned to time, or more precisely a
lack thereof, to undermine this process of atomization. By embarking upon
a hunger strike the prisoners mapped out a period of time, between sixty and
seventy days, in which they were able to breach the enclosure of space to
focus the attention of the outside world on their cause. As against a
bureaucratic colonial space, they opposed human time, or more accurately, its
finitude. As de Certeau points out367 the powerful "privilege spatial relation
ships ... [and] reduce temporal relations to spatial ones." Again, the prisoners
inverted this hierarchy and asserted their power, if only temporarily, to
indicate that even "total institutions"368 can be cracked open to P?litics.
Thus, to summarize my first reservation about postmodemism's
conception of the subject, I would suggest that it is so theoretically flimsy
that it is incapable of bearing the explanatory weight that is imposed upon
it. Therefore, it is proposed that a more robust theory would see agency and
discourse as mutually constitutive. However, one can only understand the
degree and extent of that mutuality by actually studying specific situations
in particular politico-historical conjunctures. 369 A general theory of
personhood will only reveal partial answers.
2. Complicity Through Trivialization
The second problem with the postmodern process of the "aestheticization
of politics"370 is that it potentially may be complicit in the continuation of
oppression in so far as it trivializes both experiences of injustice and acts
that seek to remedy such injustices. In particular, I am concerned that
Baudrillard's espousal of "hyperreality" and "simulation" may accrue to the

367 M. De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. S. Rendell (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1984).
368 E. Goffman, Asylum: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other
Inmates (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., I 96 I).
369 This historicized and situated conception of agency dovetails with Marx's famous
statement that:
[m]en [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they
do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances
directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past....
Supra note 9 at 300. See also, the feminist postmodernist, Scott's, proposition :
Treating the emergence of a new identity as a discursive event is not to introduce a
new form of linguistic determinism, nor to deprive the subject of agency. It is to
refuse a separation between "experience" and language and to insist instead on the
productive quality of discourse. Subjects are constituted discursively, but there are
conflicts among the discursive systems, contradictions within any one of them,
multiple meanings for the concepts they deploy. And subjects have agency. They are
not unified autonomous individuals exercising free will, but rather subjects whose
agency is created through situations and statuses conferred upon them. Being a subject
means being "subject to definite conditions of existence, conditions of the
endowments of agents and conditions of existence." These conditions enable choices,
although they are not unlimited.
J. Scott, "Experience" in Theorize, supra note 52, 22 at 34.
370 C. Norris, The Truth about Postmodernism (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers,
1993) at 17 [hereinafter Postmodernism].
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benefit of those who wield dominant political power. 371
By portraying the hunger strike as merely a particular manifestation of
hyperreality, 372 by interpreting it as yet another manifestation of "ubiquitous
simulacra, pseudo-events",373 Baudrillard may trivialize the commitment and
political consciousness of the subject hunger strikers. Death, through
starvation for over sixty days, is more than simulation; it is more than game
playing; it is more than a spectacle in the politics of illusion. Death, I would
argue, is an authentic374 and absolute act of resistance in which agency
draws on its final resource to transgress against a pseudo-hegemonic
politico-juridical regime. 375 In other words, postmodernism unmodified may
suggest too much complicity and not enough critique, an inability to
distinguish between domination and resistance. 376 It may be accurate to
argue that we cannot know whether what the fasting prisoners sought was
true in any transcendental sense, but that means neither that "truth... [has]
ceased to exist,"377 nor that we should consider subjects as paralysed by "the
spell of indecision,"378 nor that we have "nowhere to go."379
371 Hartsock articulates another criticism that straddles both of my concerns when she
argues:
Somehow it seems highly suspicious that it is at the precise moment when so many
groups have been engaged in "nationalisms" which involve redefinition of the
marginalized Others that suspicions emerge about the nature of the "subject", about
the possibilities for a general theory which can describe the world, about historical
"progress". Why is it that just at the moment when so many of us who have been
silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than
objects of history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes problematic?
N. Hartsock, "Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?" in Fraser & Nicholson, supra
note 65, 157 at I 63.
372 Smyth is getting at the same idea when he comments, "it might even be possible, in the
ultimate post-modern scenario, to tum West Belfast into a theme park featuring staged
riots and gun battles", supra note I O at 150. In fact, in my experience, this has already
happened. In the North Belfast community where I grew up during the mid 1970's there
were frequent accounts of how American journalists, not alone but in particular, would
pay children £5 to throw petrol bombs at the British army patrols just to get a good
"shot". In British occupied Northern Ireland, the throwing of a petrol bomb is considered
to be causing utmost danger to the soldiers which entitles them to shoot back with
plastic, rubber and lead bullets.
373 Hassan, supra note 40 at xvi.
374 For a discussion as to the ethical and political importance of salvaging the authenticity
of anti-colonialist resistance from "the paralysing cynicism of post-structuralism", see
Binder, Nazism, supra note 20 at 1364-1372.
375 To be clear, my suggestion here is not a euphoric valorization of sacrifice and death, as
Baudrillard occasionally verges on in both his "Symbolic Exchange and Death" in
Writings, supra note 42 at 119-148, and his discussion of the Tasaday peoples of the
Philippines in Simulations, supra note 42 at 13-17.
376 For an interpretation of postmodemism as a manifestation of the paradox of "complicity
and critique", see L. Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism (London: Routledge,
1989).
377 Baudrillard, Simulations, supra note 42 at 6. In a sense, both modernism and
postmodernism may misconceptualize the nature of truth. The former may be unduly
optimistic in its identification of truth with progress, emancipation and autonomy. The
latter unduly glib in its claim that truth is inaccessible. Truth may be domination,
subordination and death.
378 On this latter point, see Baudrillard, id. at 127 and F. Moretti, "The Spell of Indecision"
in C. Nelson & L. Grossberg, eds., Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana:
University of Illinois, 1988) at 339.
379 Schlag, "Normative", supra note 24.
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3. (Un)Truth Revisited
In order to escape the political quandary engendered by postmodemism' s
embracement of a saturated subject awash in hyperreality, I would suggest
that we can draw on, but adapt to the present context, the work of the
sociologist Margrit Eichler. In relation to issues of gender, Eichler argues
that in a world based upon (male) domination, we cannot know what
(gender) equality might look like, and consequently, we should refocus our
sights on what we do know, namely inequality, and make our task one of
modifying and minimizing these inequalities.380 Similarly, it can be argued
that although we cannot know what pristine truth might look like, we can
know those things that are manifestly untrue, and so our task becomes one
of minimizing the pervasiveness of these untruths. And, as I have argued,
it is clearly untrue that the fasting prisoners were merely "ordinary, decent,
criminals." The motivations for their alleged crimes were manifestly
political.381 They were arrested, detained, interrogated, tried and convicted
under a statute382 that characterized them as "terrorists" and defined
380 M. Eichler, "The Elusive Ideal Defining Equality" (1988) Can. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 167. A
homologous conceptual move is made by Shklar in relation to the idea of justice when
she argues that "we simply cannot know enough about men (sic) or events to fulfil the
demands of justice" and then proceeds to argue that we are a great deal more familiar
with injustice and therefore that we should make our task the minimization of injustice.
J. Shklar, "Giving Injustice its Due" (1989) 98 Yale L.J. 1135. There are also hints of
such an approach in the recent work of the feminist postmodernist, J. Flax, "The End of
Innocence", Theorize, supra note 52, 445 at 459. See also, B. Moore Jr., The Social
Bases of Obedience and Revolt (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
381 Sands, Skylark, supra note 1 .
382 A study of these laws, commissioned by Amnesty International, summarized the impact
as follows:
It has been shown in the first two parts of this analysis how the emergency legislation
· has affected every stage of the criminal justice process linked to the "Diplock" courts.
The police and the army have been given extremely wide and de facto unchallengeable
powers of arrest and detention. "Forceful", "decisive" and "persistent" interrogation is
allowed, in which the right to silence is implicitly denied. Interrogation is not under
effective (i.e., contemporaneous) judicial control; unlawful treatment of prisoners does
not give rise to the remedy of habeas corpus. At no stage of the pre-trial proceedings
has the defence any effective opportunity to challenge the prosecution case. The
availability of bail is limited. At the trial, statements obtained by "oppressive" methods
are admissible, as long as these methods did not amount to torture, or to inhuman or
degrading treatment, or unless there is evidence of physical ill-treatment.
Trial by jury has been abolished: the single judge has taken over the function of the jury
as tribunal of fact and "weighs" the evidence in a legal framework (set by himself)
which is much less strict than in ordinary trials. In most cases the evidence against the
accused consists solely of his own (alleged) confession made during police
interrogation. In such cases, the "weighing" of the evidence is in fact subsumed under
the judge's ruling on the admissibility of the confession: confessions, once admitted as
evidence, are not in practice tested further on their reliability. The scope of appellate
review is limited, at least as regards the crucial issues of the exercise of judicial
discretion in ruling on the admissibility of a confession, and of the "weighing" of
confessions by the judge acting as tribunal of fact.
A number of these aspects of the special system of criminal justice, such as the absence
of safeguards against arbitrary arrests and detentions, and the non-availability of habeas
corpus against unlawful treatment in custody, by themselves raise serious issues
concerning human rights. But the analysis of the law has shown that, for the purpose of
determining the fairness of trials in "Diplock" courts, the single most important issue
regards the reliability of confessions obtained during interrogation. As was shown
above:
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terrorism as "the use of violence for political ends."383 Their "confessions"
were admitted in circumstances which allowed for physical abuse384 and
their treatment in prison was politically motivated, particularly the
beatings.385 More broadly, what is one to make of the fact that between 1969
and 1 980 the prison population of Northern Ireland increased by almost
500%,386 except by acknowledging - as both a former Northern Ireland
premier (Major Chichester Clark) and British Secretary of State (Reginald
Maudling) have done - that the Northern Ireland and the British states·are
at "at war" with the IRA ?387 And finally, why else would the British
government derogate from its responsibilities under the European
Convention on Human Rightst88 In short, there is a radical

383
384
385
386
387
388

- the rules on interrogation are not aimed at obtaining reliable confessions and indeed
allow for methods of interrogation which can seriously affect their reliability;
- the pre-trial investigation carried out on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions
is not aimed at ensuring that only prima facie reliable confessions are tendered in
evidence;
- the tests applied by the judges in the "Diplock" courts in ruling on the admissibility
of confessions do not as a rule extend beyond ensuring that confessions tendered in
evidence by the prosecution were not obtained as a result of physical ill-treatment;
- although these tests leave out many aspects of interrogation which can seriously
affect the reliability of confessions, the courts in practice subsume their "weighing"
of the reliability of a confession under their ruling on its admissibility.
The "Diplock" courts convict in the vast majority of cases in which a confession
(allegedly) made by the accused in the course of police interrogation is the only
evidence of his guilt, as long as there was no evidence that physical ill-treatment (or
worse) was used to obtain that confession. In doing so, the courts implicitly assume the
reliability of confessions obtained as a result of interrogation in which such treatment
did not occur. It was already pointed out that it is surprising, in view of the evidentiary
problems arising out of the private nature of interrogation, that the courts so often hold
that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that nothing untoward has occurred
which might have affected the reliability of a con fession.
But even if that is left aside, there must be serious doubt about the assumption that
confessions obtained as a result of "forceful", "decisive" and "persistent" interrogation
are reliable even if nothing untoward occurred.
D. Korff, The Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland: A Fair Trial ? (Utrecht: Netherlands
Institute for Human Rights, I 984) 77-78.
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, supra note 142, s.28.
Supra note 147.
For an account of the beatings see e.g., Bishop & Mallie, supra note 123 at 279. For a
close documentation see e.g., Feldman, supra note 138 at 147-217.
Coogan, Blanket, supra note 157 at xi. The actual figures are: 1968: 727; 1970: 944;
1974: 2,650; 1980: 2,500. See also Feldman, supra note 138 at 148-149; T. Hadden,
"Who are the Terrorists?", Fortnight 6 (7 May 1976).
Clark said, "Northern Ireland is at war with the Irish Republican Army Provisionals" and
Maudling stated that the British government was "now in a state of open war with the
IRA," quoted in Feehan, supra note 166 at 68-69.
Britain has, on several occasions, exercised its derogation powers under Article 15 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (supra note 232):
( I ) In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligation under this
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under
international law.
(2) No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts
of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph I ) and 7 shall be made under this
provision.
(3) Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which
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incommensurability between the juridical construction of the prisoners as
"odes" and the incontrovertible existence of a specifically tailored legal
process that simply cannot fit within the frame of that legal construct.
Thus, it seems to me that if we re-orient our inquiry from the quest for
Truth, to the minimization of untruths, we can adopt the postmodern virtue
of self-reflexivity and modesty without necessarily being forced to embrace
its vice of being self undermining.389 As Bernstein, echoing Habermas,
points out, "[v]iolence and distortion may be uneliminable, but they can be
diminished."390
C. Language and power
The foregoing reflections on postmodemism and deconstruction, law and
truth, agency and death also suggest a reconsideration of the relationship
between language and power through an analysis of the politics of language.
In recent years, a significant number of North American and European
academics, each in their own way inspired by what is sometimes called "the
interpretative tum", have begun to espouse a faith in the reconstructive
potential of "discourse," "dialogue," or "conversation" as a way to mediate
societal and juridical polarization.391 In response, this article suggests that
those who chase the hare of dialogic democracy have a relatively "shallow"
conception of societal difference. Their optimism leads them to over
emphasize the rehabilitative power of ."discourse," "interpretation" and
"intersubjectivity" and, therefore, perhaps ironically, to underestimate just
how profound "deep diversity" can be. Specifically, I would draw attention
to the question of the politics of language in Ireland.
Like every good colonial power, the British recognized the importance
of eliminating local languages, because the erasure of language can play a

it has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the Secretary-General of
the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the
provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.
See 1955-1957 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 50 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1969 Y.B.
Eur. Conv. on H.R. 72-74 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1971 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on
H.R. 32 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1973 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 24-28 (Eur.
Comm'n on Human Rights); 1975 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 18 (Eur. Comm. H.R.); 1978
Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 22 (Eur. Comm.H.R.).
389 Indeed this shift of focus parallels, to some extent, Norris' recent attempts to argue that
Derrida cannot be lodged in the same camp as the levelling and relativistic
postmodernists because, in certain selected passages in his work, Derrida does posit that
there are precise standards of interpretive truth such as argumentative rigour and
consistency, Norris, "Afterward", Deconstruction, supra note 13 at 145-158. My point
is that Britain's approach to the prisoners is riddled with inconsistencies and therefore
indefensible.
390 Bernstein, supra note 113 at 205.
391 See e.g., J.S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic
Reform (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); J. Habermas, The Theory of
Communicative Action, trans. T. McCarthy, (Boston: Beecon Press, 1984); R. Rorty,
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) at
373; M. Waltzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York:
Basic Books, 1983); J.B. White, Justice as Translation (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1990); A. Cook, "Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr." (1990) l 03 Harv. L Rev. 985 al I 044.
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vital role in the elimination of a culture.392 Despite revivals, Irish has been
relegated to a peripheral and ritualistic role in Irish society. However, at the
very margins of the British state, in the prison camp - which at the same
tiine represents Britain's colonial heart - many of the prisoners discovered
the Irish language for the first time.393 Having come to terms with "jailic",
they advanced with their programmes of political reflection and future
vision.394 And more particularly, it was through their Irish language classes
that they disinterred the pre-colonial Brehon law system, the practice of
troscead and an alternative juridical langscape. But though they translated
this juridical claim into English as "hunger strike", it was not understood as
a legal claim because the jurisprudential and historical framework from
which it emerged remained incomprehensible to the English juridical
psyche. To say that something was lost in the translation would be an
understatement.
When legal cultures collide, it is not simply a conversation and the
exchange of mutually transparent interpretations. 395 Law and politics are a
great deal more messy than discoursing. Juridical "conversations", as Robert
Cover reminds us, take place on "a plain of pain and death",396 and it is that
reality that is the vital difference of law. To occult that distinction, to suggest
that the assertion of legal rights is a matter of spelling it out, is to create a
false sense of optimism for ·the achievement of solutions to what are
frequently intractable problems of diversity. And the losers will be "the
other", those who cannot - or will not - speak the dominant discourse. As
Foucault comments, "the history which bears and determines us has the form
of war rather than language."397 Moreover, to manifest an excessive faith in
dialogue may, in fact, be to the disadvantage of those who are dispossessed
because it may give rise to "a dictatorship of the articulate."398 Therefore, I
would suggest that in relation to "jurispathic"399 legal cultures such as those
of western liberal democratic societies, the hunger strike demonstrates the
tragic extent to which the "other" will have to go to their identity.
392 In 1492, Antonio de Nebrija is reported to have justified his Gramatica to Queen
Isabella of Spain on the basis that "(l)anguage is the perfect instrument of empire." See
Williams supra note 7 at 74.
393 It might be noted here, in support of the earlier argument as to the importance of agency,
that the prisoners used their feces-covered walls as a type of "chalkboard" when learning
to speak and write Gaelic. Sands, Life, supra note 157 at 53. It has also been reported,
in order to challenge the glum monotony of the cells, one prisoner created patterns with
his feces: of palm trees! Coogan, Blanket, supra note 157 at 209.
394 Sands, "Training Camp", Skylark, supra note I at 150.
395 To be clear, my point is not that the struggle over the meaning of signifiers is
unimportant. Certainly, there is no doubt the difference between "ode" and "hac" on the
one hand, and "political prisoners" and "freedom fighters" on the other, is strategically
essential. It is just that political engagement requires more than the power to determine
the terms of discursive practice. As Marx notes, "(m)aterial force can only be overthrown
by material force", F. Bender, ed., Karl Marx: The Essential Writings 47 (Boulder:
Westview, 1986).
396 R. Cover, "Violence and the Word" (1986) 95 Yale L.J. 1601.
397 M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, /972-1977
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) at 114.
398 W. Kymlicka, "Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality" ( 1989) 99 Ethics 883 at
900.
399 Cover, supra note 23 at 16.
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D. Identity Politics and Postmodernism400
For some who subscribe to postmodemism and deconstruction, my
foregoing criticisms may appear to deradicalize and domesticate · the
subversive insights of these approaches.401 More importantly, it might be
suggested that this essay is premised upon a vision - my espousal of a
jurisprudence that is based upon the identity politics of Irish nationalism that is subject to the withering gaze of deconstruction. In short, I have sawn
off the branch upon which I am sitting.
In other words, it might be argued that, insofar as my conception of
jurisprudence converts a "conception of identity into a ground of
politics",402 it is necessarily subject to the deconstructive insight that such
a strategy is dependent on a point of contradiction: in this case the British
law. Deconstruction, I am likely to be reminded, demands more than a
simple reversal of hierarchy for that merely reproduces binarism without
subverting the very concept of hierarchy; displacement engenders a
multiplicity that cannot be reduced to (nationalist) identity.403 It may be
argued that the valorization of identity - an Irish jural other reinforces and perpetuates the very system of domination that it seeks to
transgress - British juridical colonialism - achieving what Schlag
suggests is only a "suicidal reinscription of precisely the sort of
hierarchical dualities .. . that deconstruction seeks to subvert and dis
place. "404 Moreover, given postmodernism's commitment to anti-essential
ism, the very idea of an Irish identity is (in its best light) a delusive
artifact, a quaint ethnocentric sentimentality, and therefore incapable of
bearing the juridical weight that I would wish to impose upon it.405 In its
worst light, identity jurisprudence smacks of "national aestheticism" and
a zealous patriotism that, historically, has done more harm than good.406
400 Alexandra Dobrowolsky has encouraged me to think about the relationship between law,
postmodemism and identity, see e.g., A. Dobrowolsky, The Stakes of Struggle:
Democracy, Constitutionalism and Collective Actors in Canada (1992) [unpublished]
[hereinafter Stakes]; A. Dobrowolsky, "The Charter and Mainstream Political Science:
Waves of Practical Contestation and Changing Theoretical Currents" in K. Sutherland
& D. Schneiderman, eds., Charting the Consequences: Impact of the Charter of Rights
on law and Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995).
401 See e.g., "Le Hors", supra note 24.
402 J. Butler, "Gender Trouble: Feminist Theory and Psychoanalytic Discourse" in Fraser
& Nicholson, supra note 65, 324 at 327.
403 For an uncompromising analysis and rejection of Derrida's deconstruction of Jewish
identity politics, see Binder, supra note 20 at 1372-1383.
404 "Le Hors", supra note 24 at 1649.
405 Baudrillard might formulate the criticism differently. He would probably argue that
identity politics is a form of representational politics, but in a world of simulacra there
is no origin to re-present, for we subjects are always already reproduced.
406 As Mohr argues:
Much of what has been termed postmodern has been viewed as destructive and
nihilistic. The pathway barely sketched here examines only what ought to be clear in
any case, that the overwhelming amount of the nihilism and destructiveness in this
century arose from the notion of sovereignty, the legally constituted national state.
Despite this experience, we are still a long way from being able to resist the seduction
to reconstitute this kind of state and the legal form that is said to flow from it, but in
fact makes its nihilism possible. One ought to rejoice when such efforts are rejected
by the majority of a people, even if the reasons given for their negation sound awful.
Mohr, supra note 24 at 379. See also, M. Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle
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By definition, identity constrains and excludes; therefore, what is required
is "a liberation from identity."407
In response to these potential arguments, three points might be made.
First, although I recognize that identity politics is incapable of having an
essentialist base, that does not mean that it is nothing, and it certainly
does not mean that it is necessarily reactionary. Rather, we can recognize
the inevitably artifactual nature of a perspective - and can even
countenance the dynamic nature of such identities408 - but still operate
in a self-reflexive and politically engaged way on the basis of such
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) at 8; R. Walker, One World, Many Worlds
(Boulder: Lynne Reinner, I988); J.H. Miller, "Deconstruction and Cultural Criticism"
(1991) 13 Cardoza L Rev. 1255. See also Derrida's critique of the "desire for Kingdom"
supra note 281.
407 N. Fraser, "False Antithesis: A reply to Seyla Benhabib and Judith Butler" (199 1 ) I I
Praxis International 166, 175. The issue of identity politics has come to the fore most
notably in relation to issues of gender and, in particular, the feminist tendency to rely
on the category of "woman" as a basis for their critique of partriachal power and the
quest for gender equality. Derrida, for example, perturbed by the tendency for
distributing "sexual identity cards", Derrida & C. McDonald, "Choreographies" (1982)
12:2 Diacritics 66, 69, has argued that such an espousal of identity not only operates as
a mere inversion and therefore a failure to displace, but also smacks of essentialism and
naturalism:
Perhaps ... the "woman" is not a determinable identity. Perhaps woman is not some
thing which announces itself from a distance, at a distance from some other thing....
Perhaps woman - a non-identity, a non-figure, a simulacrum - is distance's very
chasm, the out-distancing of distance, the interval's cadence, distance itself.. ..
Feminism is nothing but the operation of a woman who aspires to be like a man. And
in order to resemble the masculine dogmatic philosopher this woman lays claim just as much claim as he - to truth, science and objectivity in all their castrated
delusions of virility. Feminism that seeks to castrate.
J. Derrida, Spurs: Nietzche's Styles - Eperons: Les styles de Nietzsche, trans. B. Harlow
(Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1978) at 49, 65.
Subsequently, he has cooled the rhetoric but re-asserted the same point:
This is the risk. The effect of the Law is to build the structure of the subject, and as
soon as you say, "well, the woman. is subject and this subject deserves equal rights,"
and so on - then you are caught in the logic of phallogocentrism and you have
rebuilt the empire of the Law. So it seems that women's studies can't go very far if
it does not deconstruct the philosophical framework of this situation, starting with the
notion of subject, of ego, of consciousness, soul and body, and so on.
Quoted in S. Hekman, Gender and Knowledge: Elements of a Post-modem Feminism
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, I 990) at 68.
Such positions have generated critiques from several feminists who argue that a (suitably
revised) category of "woman" is absolutely necessary to ground feminist praxis. See e.g.,
L. Alcoff, "Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist
Theory" in M. Malson et al, Feminist Theory in Practice and Process 295, 322
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); C. Di Stephano, "Dilemmas of Difference:
Feminism, Modernity and Postmodemism" in Fraser & Nicholson, supra note 65, 63,
75-76. For a defence of Derrida by a feminist, see D. Cornell, Beyond, supra note 19 at
77-117.
408 For an attempt to make this Jype of argument in relation to gender identity see, T.
Delaurentis, Feminist Studies/Critical Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1986) at 8 . See also, Alcoffs concept of "positionality" which conceives of "human
subjectivity as an emergent property of a historized experience", where identity is
"relative to a constantly shifting context, to a situation that includes a network of
elements involving others, the objective economic conditions, cultural and political
institutions and ideologies and so on", Alco ff, id. 407 at 321, 323.
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identities. Irish Republicanism of the 1970s and 1 980s may illustrate this.
As I have indicated previously,409 in the 1970s and particularly within the
"Republican university", Long Kesh, Republicanism underwent a
significant transition from being militaristic and abstentionist in its
orientation, to becoming politically participatory and self-consciously
socialist. This transformation of identity was confirmed at the Ard Fheis
(Annual Conference) of Sinn Fein in 1985 when the political and
ideological leadership of the organization was transferred from the
conservative purists of the south of Ireland to the leftist pragmatists of the
north of Ireland.410 To argue that identity has no natural, essential or
absolute significance, to accept the impossibility of "a rigorously pure
self-identity"4 1 1 does not necessarily commit one to the sclerotic claims
that identity politics is misconceived or that it is a simple reaffirmation
of vulgar traditionalism. It simply allows us to recognize that difference
and identity are constitutively interlocking, to be conscious of the
inevitability of political change, and to forewarn us not to expect or
impose closure. Nationalism, no less than law or language, is a protean
and contested terrain, with both negative and positive implications.4 1 2
The second point relates to empowerment. Postmodernist reservations
about identity politics are intertwined with its conception of the subject.
It is argued that because the self is constructed to the core it is a mistaken
essentialist quest to seek out an identity. Rather, the subject may have
multiple and often potentially conflicting identities that are so fluid and
unstable that they cannot be constrained within, for example, a nationalist
identity. This is an important insight into the complexity of subjecthood.
However, I fear that it can potentially lead to a radically individualized
politico-ontology in which there is an excessive focus on each person's
particular circumstances. If so, this might well have the effect of
marginalizing the group aspects of a person's identity thereby fostering
singularity rather than solidarity.413 As a consequence, postmodemism may
devalue that aspect of ourselves that many value highly: our group
membership.414 For the subordinated this experience of group identity may
act as a form of empowerment and solidarity.415 Once again the H Blocks
Supra note 136.
Clarke, supra note 154.
Ryan, supra note 171 at 10.
Furthermore, it might also be noted that recently (Sept. 1994) and after 25 years of "the
troubles" the IRA and Sinn Fein have gone even further in their restructuring of Irish
republicanism by unilaterally declaring a ceasefire. Gerry Adams has been a central
player in this re-orientation of Irish nationalism. For similar attempts to rethink identity
see Dobrowolsky, Stakes, supra note 400 at 12; D. Boyarin & J. Boyarin, "Diaspora:
Generation and The Ground of Jewish Identity" (1993) 17 Critical Inquiry 693.
4 1 3 Stakes, supra note 400 at 1 1 -12.
4 14 I.M. Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal
Citizenship" (1989) 99 Ethics 250 at 251.
4 I 5 As Max Weber notes, "[f]reedom and democracy are possible only where the resolute·
will of a nation not to allow itself to be ruled like sheep is permanently alive" in M.
Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology ed. by H. Gerth & C.W. Mills, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1946) at 71. Barrington Moore suggests, "pure moral
autonomy in the form of lone resistance to an apparently benign authority is very rare.
With support from peers, on the other hand, the same kind of resistance increases

409
410
411
412
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provide an example of how empowerment is achieved through what one
commentator has described as "the solidarity of collective vocality",4 16 in
this case, Gaelic.
Third, and this is a more negative and clearly strategic argument, it is
not as if identity politics is always the "chosen" terrain of struggle by the
disempowered. Those who oppress do so, in part, because of the
"identity" of "the other," because of differences in race, gender or
nationality. The "criminalization" project of the British government was
very much driven by the question of identity; by encoding the prisoners
as criminals its aim was to efface the nationalist liberation context for
their alleged acts. The protests and the fasts �ere an attempt to re-assert
their Irish identity and their legal rights as prisoners of war on the basis
of that identity. Identity politics can be operative not only when identity
is explicitly invoked, but even when it is denied. In other words, identity
is a terrain of political struggle that the oppressed simply cannot afford
to abdicate.
E. One Step Forward, One Step Back, One Step to the...
I find myself in a curious situation in this essay. On the one hand it
seems that postmodemism and deconstruction - through their critiques
of hierarchy, subordination and oppression - are analytically and
strategically valuable in enabling dissidents to identify fissures that offer
emancipatory potential in a dominant social order. On the other hand,
postmodemism and deconstruction may undermine dissident practices by
positing that they are but simulacra with no necessary connection to
reality, truth or justice, or at least no connection that would make a
difference. I only want to go part way, to acknowledge that postmodern
ism and deconstruction can be forms of resistance417 but without having
to purchase their unremitting guardedness. I want to employ their insights
as modes of politico-juridical analysis to facilitate a reconfiguration of
Anglo-Irish relations, to deconstruct Britain's juridical hegemony. How
ever, as Linda Hutcheon says of feminist encounters with postmodernism,
"exposition may be the first step; but it cannot be the last."4 18
To maintain this position, and to avoid this sense of one step forward,
one step back, it will be necessary (as a preliminary move) to draw a
distinction between postmodernism as a political philosophy and decon
struction as a method of interpretation. By means of this disassociation it
may be possible to argue that an embracement of deconstruction as a
mode of analysis does not require a correlative commitment to
enormously.... What the data reveal is the significance of social support for correct moral
reasoning", Moore, supra note 321 at 97. See also, Fantasia, supra note 202.
416 Feldman, supra note 138 at 216-217. For accounts of the importance of group solidarity
in maintaining the "dirty protest", see Sands, life, supra note 157, and Clarke, supra
note 154 at 78, 122.
417 H. Foster, Re-Codings: Art, Spectacle, Cultural Politics (Port Townsend, Wash.: Bay
Press, 1985) xii at I 21. See also, S. Lash, Sociology of Postmodernism (London,
England: Routledge, 1990) at 37, 52 distinguishing between "mainstream" or
"reactionary" postmodernism, and "oppositional" or "progressive" postmodernism.
4 I 8 Hutcheon, supra note 376 at 152-153.
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postmodemism with its eschewal of political practice and its predilection
for relentless sceptical indifference. 419 It is the spectre of Baudrillard that
makes me hesitate. In a discussion that has haunting relevance to the
concerns raised by this article he argues:
If being nihilist is to take, to the unendurable limit of the hegemonic
systems, this radic: al act of derision and violence, this challenge, which the
system is summoned to respond to by its own death, then I am a terrorist
and a nihilist in theory as others are through arms. Theoretical violence, not
truth, is the sole expedient remaining to us.
But this is a utopia. For it would be admirable to be a nihilist, if radicality
still existed - as it would be admirable to be a terrorist if death, including
that of the terrorist, still had meaning.
But this is where things become insoluble. For opposed to this nihilism of
radicality is the system's own, the nihilism of neutralisation. The system
itself is also nihilist, in the sense that it has the power to reverse everything
in indiffere ntiation, including that which denies it.420

This, I think, goes too far. Beyond being a hyperbolic academic
appropriation of experiences, discourses and practices of "terrorists", it
callously undermines the final hopes of those who seek to resist in what
appear to be impossibly oppressive conditions. It overemphasizes the
power of contemporary social structures and underanalyses the potential
for transgressive praxis.
However, an uncoupling of postrnodemism and deconstruction is only
a first step. In order to avoid the conclusion that death by fasting has no
meaning, it seems to me that it is not enough to simply trash Baudrillard,
for that may only be a form of scapegoating for a tendency that is latent
in a deconstructionist mode of analysis. Therefore, as a second step, de
construction, too, will have to be reconsidered, dereified and deflated. It
must be shorn of its pretensions to be "a general law",421 a generalization
"without present or perceptible limit",422 "a general, theoretical and sys
tematic strategy"423 or a canonized cognate of "justice."424 Regardless of
what Derrida - the author - might say,425 deconstruction itself is prob419 I gain some support for this strategy in the work of Christopher Norris. See e.g., Norris,
Postmodernism, supra note 370 at 52; and Norris, Deconstruction, supra note 13 at 148156.
420 J. Baudrillard, "On Nihilism", (1984) 6 On The Beach 38.
421 Derrida, Margins, supra note 99 at 15.
422 Derrida, Beyond, supra note 25 at 167-168.
423 Derrida, Positions, supra note 94 at 68.
424 Derrida, "Force", supra note 10 at 945.
425 Consider, for example, that Derrida, in faithful reified deference, argues that,
"deconstruction...has never presented itself as a method...." Beyond, supra note 25 at
168. Or again, his proposition that:
Deconstruction takes place, it is an event that does not wait the deliberation,
consciousness or organization of a subject, or even of modernity. It deconstructs itself.
It can be deconstructed.
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ably best understood as a rigorous methodology426 that enables one to
critically interrogate those propositions that aspire to be universal,
authoritative and incontrovertible; to demonstrate how they are, in fact,
contingent, ambiguous and contestable. In this way, deconstruction can
expose the pervasiveness of power rather than reason. And that, I believe,
is productive.
VI. (In) Conclusion
For some, particularly those of a conservative and repressive political
bent, my re-presentation and revalorization of the marginalized fasting
prisoners as having a well founded jurisgenerative claim will reconfirm
the moral bankruptcy of postmodern analyses. For such critics it will
appear that added to the disreputable pantheon of Neitzsche the totalitarian
"proto-Nazi", Heidegger the "Nazi",427 and Paul De Man "a Nazi
collaborationist, ... propagandist"428 and "antisemite",429 is Bobby Sands the
"terrorist criminal."
Two responses may be appropriate to such a challenge. The first is a
clarification of my argument; the second, is to destabilize conceit and to
parry the reproach of immorality. First, conservative moralism misses the
point. This essay (as part of a larger enterprise to construct a critical
consciousness and articulate a radical jurisprudence) takes as its starting
point the problem of human suffering, and has as its end point the
diminution of such suffering. It is an attempt to disempower the em
powered, and to juridically empower the disempowered as they struggle
against domination. Consequently, the article is neither an attempt to
legitimize the military campaign of the IRA against the continued British
occupation of Ireland, nor the installation of yet more heroes in the
pantheon of Irish martyrdom. Rather, I have considered how the
repressive state apparatuses operate at a pervasive ideological level to
impose one interpretation through the erasure of another, and to illustrate
how those who would appear to be almost completely disempowered can
resist, struggle and re-affirm their agency. Law, I have argued, is an
integral element in this struggle between colonization and decolonization.
My aim (as a member of the Irish diaspora) has been to re-present the
unpresentable, to argue that the prisoners quite literally embodied law, and
thereby, to facilitate "the return of the repressed."430

426
427

428
429
430

J. Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend" in R. Bernasconi & D. Wood, eds., Derrida and
Differa nce (Evanston, Fl.: Northwestern University Press, 1985) 1 at 4.
See also, C. Norris, The Contest of the Faculties (New York: Methuen, 1985) at 18.
For discussions see V. Farias, Heidegger and Nazism (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1989); R. Wolin, The Politics ofBeing: The Political Thought ofMartin Heidegger
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); P. Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and
Politics: The Fichon of the Political (Oxford, England: B. Blackwell, 1990).
A. Austin, "A Primer on Deconstructions 'Rhapsody of Word Plays'" (1992) 71 N.C.L
Rev. 201, 212.
D. Lehman, Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul De Man (New
York: Poseidon Press, 1 991); W. Hamacher et al, eds., Responses: on Paul De Man's
Wartime Journalism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989).
F. Jameson, Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1991) at 1 99.
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Second, it is important to confront the juridical smugness of moralistic
conservatism head on. The assumption underlying such an approach is that
law is the antithesis of violence. But, as I have argued elsewhere,431
critical reflection requires a destabilization of "our" cherished convictions.
This leads us to rethink law's position in the "economy of violence",432 in
the "economy of death",433 and to recognize with Benjamin that "there is
something rotten at the heart of law."434 As Ryan suggests:
[t]errorism can be j udged to be outside the law only i f the l aw is i tself
deemed i nnocent and untouched by violence .... The recognition that one's
own theoretical position is contaminated by the practice o ne condemns
removes the grounds of normative j udgment.435

It is through vigilance, through the questioning of law itself, that
jurisprudence can best fulfil its responsibility.436
Viewed in this light, deconstruction and postmodernism can be
understood as responsible practices. Insofar as they provide us with the
critically empowering strategy of destabilizing preconceptions and pre
judices, they can allow for alterity and the possibility of the insurrection
of "subjugated knowledges."437 My turn to postmodernism and
deconstruction is designed to generate an "impudent" re-reading of events
in British occupied Northern Ireland, to articulate a radical alterity. As
Derrida quips, "(t)he fact that law is deconstructible is not bad news. _We
may even see in this a stroke of luck for politics, for all historical
progress."438 My aim has been to hang on to the critical Derridean
proposition that we try:
to recognize and analyze [violence] as best we can i n its various forms:
obvious or disguised, i nstitutional or i ndividual, literal o r metaphoric,
Devlin, "Law's Centaur", supra note 8.
"Violence and Metaphysics" in Writing, supra note 107 at 117.
Margins, supra note 99 at 4; Writing, supra note 107 at 102.
Supra note 284 at 286.
Ryan, supra note 171 at 121.
A third point may also be worth addressing: the question whether Sands was a
"terrorist"? The debate as to whether dissidents like Sands are "terrorists" or "freedom
fighters" is perennial and probably irresolvable. What is of greater importance are the
circumstances of Sands' imprisonment. Between 1972, when he was eighteen, and his
death at the age of twenty seven in 198 1, Sands spent all but six months of that time in
jail. The first arrest and imprisonment was made on the basis of some guns that were
found in a house where he was staying. No evidence was adduced to demonstrate that
he knew about, or had ever been in contact with, these weapons. For this he spent three
years in Long Kesh with political prisoner status. Six months after his release, he was
re-arrested, this time for allegedly being involved in a bombing operation. The judge
found that there was no evidence linking Sands to the bombing. However, because one
revolver was found in a car in which Sands and several others had been travelling at the
time of the arrest, the judge gave each of them fourteen years - fifty six in total - for
possession of one revolver. On both occasions, Sands only "crime" was possession of
firearms in what were hardly clear-cut circumstances.
437 B. Hooks, Yearning: Race, Gender and Politics (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1990) at
8.
438 Derrida, "Force", supra note 10 at 943-945.
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candid or hypocritical, in good or guilty conscience. And if, as I believe,
violence remains in fact (almost) ineradicable, its analysis and the most

refined, ingenious account of its conditions will be the least violent
gestures, perhaps even non-violent, and in any case those which contribute
439

most to transforming the legal-ethical-political rules ....

And yet, at the same time, I have felt a significant circumspection in the
embracement of postmodemism. In its reluctance to engage with concrete
social relations,440 in the fickleness of its "paralogic" conception of
justice,44 1 and its misdiagnosis that "law and order themselves might really
be nothing more than a simulation",442 it can leave us disempowered in
our attempts to modify oppression, enraptured and ensnared by its own
theoretical purity.
To paraphrase an (Italian) political prisoner: as against the (French)
"pessimism of the inteiligence" of an unmodified postmodemism and
deconstruction, the story of the hunger strike illustrates an (Irish)
"optimism of the will."443
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44 1
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J. Derrida, limited Inc. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1989) at 112.
Supra, Part V, A.
Lyotard, Condition, supra note 19 at 60.
Baudrillard, Simulations, supra note 42 at 38.
A. Gramsci, Selections From Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers,
1977) at 175.

